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Some L o g ic a l  Consequences o f  the Status  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  Theory
INTRODUCTION
The status ch a ra c te r is t ic s  theory was introduced by Berger, Cohen and 
Zeldi tch (1 9 6 6 ) .  In i t s  i n i t i a l  formula t ion,  i t  was designed to cover the 
status organ iz ing process in s i tu a t ions  invo lv ing  two in te rac tan ts  oriented  
towards a s ing le  task,  with the actors possessing only one act ivated di ffuse  
c h a r a c t e r is t i c .  The second stage o f  the theory ,  formulated by Berger and 
Fisek (1974 ) ,  enlarged the scope o f  the theory to include s i tu a t ions  in 
which actors possess any number o f  s a l i e n t  c h a r a c t e r is t i c s .  These character­
i s t i c s  were d iv ided in to  two types: d i f fuse  and s p e c i f i c .  The th i rd  and 
current  stage developed by Berger,  Fisek and Norman (1977) now covers m u l t i ­
c h a ra c te r is t ic  status s i tu a t ions  involv ing more than two actors ,  and actors 
o f  d i f f e r e n t  types. The primary task o f  the present paper is to present and 
prove theorems th a t  are consequences o f  th is  t h i r d  stage o f  the status char­
a c t e r i s t i c s  program. We bel ieve th a t  these theorems are important and i n t e r ­
est ing in t h e i r  own r i g h t .  But before lay ing out the theory and some o f  i ts  
consequences, we want to consider b r i e f l y  some methodological issues con­
cerning the ro le  tha t  the deductive development o f  a theory can play in the 
evolution o f  a theory.
I t  has been a debated question whether the axiomat izat ion  of  theories  
is  a p r o f i t a b l e  a c t i v i t y  for  sociology, even though the method has been 
successfu l ly  used in economics and psychology fo r  many y e a r s J  In our opinion,  
much o f  th is  debate has been s t e r i l e  due to the s c a r c i ty  o f  serious examples 
which have been advanced for  considerat ion.  Many discussions involve  
"theories"  which have been s p e c ia l ly  constructed fo r  the purposes o f  a r ­
guing a p a r t i c u l a r  po in t ,  and which are so p r im i t iv e  th a t  they f a i l  to ade­
quately represent  the features which powerful soc io logical  theories actua l ly
2in use possess. For example, one o f  the most commonly c i te d  examples o f  an 
axiomatic theory in sociology is  the reconstruction o f  Durkheim's theory 
o f  labor given in  Zetterberg (1963 ) .  But th is  example is  e n t i r e l y  q u a l i ­
t a t i v e  in na ture ,  and employs no mathematical apparatus o f  the kind essential  
to go beyond the "everyday reasoning" suggested as appropriate by Zetterberg.  
Thus our second ob jec t ive  in th is  paper is to show t h a t  a socio logical  theory 
can be developed in a manner th a t  employs an axiomat ic methodology. In the 
face o f  evidence th a t  a theory can be cast in the form o f  an axiomatic sys­
tem, and t h a t  i t s  development can take place along l o g i c a l l y  well  established  
l i n e s ,  the normative question o f  whether such approaches should be taken be­
comes much less important.  This we argue is because the theory presented 
here has a long h is t o r y ,  and the developments provided in the form o f  
theorems w i l l ,  i f  confirmed exper im enta l ly ,  extend the scope o f  that  theory 
s t i l l  f u r t h e r .  Thus we want to suggest a way o f  viewing theories and t h e i r  
progress which argues for  an increased emphasis on the deductive development 
o f  theories fo r  h e u r is t ic  purposes. Instead o f  emphasizing the advantages 
o f  ax iomat izat ion for  log ica l  an a lys is ,  a case should be made for  i ts  ad­
vantages in increasing the scope and power o f  a theory.  In p a r t i c u la r ,  
theorem proving has been fo r  the most part  a neglected a c t i v i t y  in soc­
io logy.  Some o f  i t s  advantages w i l l ,  we hope, be seen in th is  paper.
We adopt a t r a d i t i o n a l  view o f  the s t ruc tu re  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  theories  
here.^ I t  consists o f  f i r s t ,  a 1anguage in which the theory is formulated.  
For present purposes, th is  is English augmented by whatever mathematics 
is required.  Secondly,  there is a set  o f  basic assumptions or axioms from 
which, together  with standard log ic a l  and mathematical rules o f  inference,  
th“£ theorems o f  the theory can be derived. Here, the axioms are Assumptions 
1 through 5 o f  §1. These fundamental assumptions are formulated using a
3set o f  p r im i t iv e  terms, together with terms defined via those p r im i t ive s .
Our basic assumptions make use o f  qu i te  abs trac t  concepts such as gener­
a l ize d  expectat ion s t a t e s ,  s p e c i f ic  task outcome s t a t e s ,  and abs trac t  task 
a b i l i t y .  While we bel ieve th a t  sense can be made o f  claiming th a t  these 
terms r e f e r  to e n t i t i e s  th a t  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t ,  the fa c t  t h a t  no d i r e c t  l in k  
with observation is  made fo r  these terms is  not  a disadvantage. Indeed, we 
view that  fea ture  o f  the theory as an asset .  I n s i s t i n g  upon too immediate 
a connection with observables could unnecessari ly l i m i t  the scope o f  the 
theory to a l ready an t ic ip a te d  s i tu a t io n s .  Much o f  the point  o f  using a 
central  core o f  abs trac t  assumptions is to al low extension o f  the theory to 
areas unforeseen i n i t i a l l y .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  we see no reason to fol low  
Blalock's guidel ines (see Blalock 1969, p. 1 8 ) :  t h a t  the c r i t e r i a  for  
select ing axioms fo r  a theory is th a t  they should be proposit ions involv ing  
concepts which are d i r e c t l y  l inked causa l ly .  For example, the fourth  
assumption o f  our theory has no causal content.  We believe th a t  contact  
between an ab s t ra c t  theory and empir ica l  data is  made to a large  extent  via  
the a u x i l i a r y  assumptions o f  a theory.  In the present,  t h i r d  stage, t h i s ,  
role is played by Assumption 5* .  We stress t h a t  th is  assumption is not a 
central  par t  o f  the abs trac t  status c h a r a c te r is t ic s  theory.  Further,  the 
p a r t ic u la r  form o f  the p r o b a b i l i t y  funct ion used in Assumption 5* depends 
upon the nature o f  the standardized experimental s i tu a t io n  being used. I f  
we used a d i f f e r e n t  type o f  experimental s i tu a t io n  to te s t  th is  status theory,  
we might well be led to use a d i f f e r e n t  form o f  the funct ion .
For a host o f  reasons, the notion o f  a theory has come to be most strong­
l y  associated with the idea o f  a se t  o f  assumptions and i t  is now common to 
ident i  fy a theory with the set  o f  a l l  log ica l  consequences o f  i t s  axioms.
Part ly  as a r e s u l t  o f  the fa c t  th a t  th is  c h a ra c te r iz a t io n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
theories was c lo s e ly  modelled on the log ica l  s t ruc ture  o f  mathematical theor ies ,
i t  has often been dismissed by working sc ie n t is ts  as too r i g i d .  Perhaps 
the charge most f re q u e n t ly  l e v e l le d  against axiomatic formulations o f  
theories is  t h a t  they are su i tab le  only for  "dead" theories upon which no 
fu r the r  work has to be done. This c r i t i c i s m  is  to a ce r ta in  extent  j u s t i ­
f ie d .  A concern w ith  axiomatic formulations of ten involves ignoring the 
most important fea tu re  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  theories -  th a t  they are dynamic objects.  
For example, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  a theory with the deductive closure o f  i t s  
axioms makes no al lowance fo r  the s c i e n t i f i c  a c t i v i t y  o f  e labora t ing  a 
theory. As a r e s u l t  o f  th is  view o f  theor ies as s t a t i c  e n t i t i e s  (which has 
d is t in c t  value f o r  a log ica l  ra ther  than a methodological analysis  of  a 
theory) ,  the h e u r i s t i c  advantages o f  using the axiomatic approach in devel­
oping a theory have been i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  stressed.
In fa c t  ax iom at iza t ion  and in p a r t ic u la r  theorem proving have some ob­
vious advantages in  f a c i l i t a t i n g  the growth and development o f  theor ies .  
Without at tempting to be exhaustive on this m at te r ,  i t  is  appropr iate  in 
th is  context to  b r i e f l y  review some o f  these advantages. F i r s t ,  theorems 
w i l l  often suggest empirical tests o f  the theory which are not evident from 
the assumptions themselves. For the theorems genera l ly  apply to a more re ­
s t r ic te d  set  o f  circumstances than do the axioms, which have wide scope by 
design. Thus, as w i l l  be seen, our Theorem 1 applies to s i tu a t io n s  where the 
actors are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  by a p a i r  o f  c h a ra c te r is t ic  s t a te s ,  and the strength 
o f  relevance between th a t  c h a ra c te r is t ic  and the task is v a r ied .  Such r e ­
s t r ic t io n s  are extremely helpful  in se t t ing  up tests  o f  a theory ,  because the 
type o f  experimental s i tu a t io n  required is l a i d  out in the hypothesis o f  the 
theorem. Secondly,  because d i rec t  tests o f  the assumptions themselves are 
often d i f f i c u l t  due to t h e i r  abstrac t  nature,  i t  is of ten necessary to draw 
out theorems by combining the assumptions in order to br ing the a u x i l ia ry  
hypotheses o f  the theory in to  play .  Further,  the greater  the number of
consequences e x p l i c i t l y  drawn out ,  the wider the poten t ia l  area o f  contact  
with experience w i l l  be and the b e t te r  are we able to te s t  the theory,  as 
well  as apply i t .  T h i r d ly ,  although axiomat izat ion alone w i l l  often make 
comparison with competing theor ies  e a s ie r ,  one is  not always in the simple 
s i tu a t ion  where the axioms o f  two theories are d i r e c t l y  comparable. More 
f requently i t  w i l l  not be ev ident  j u s t  where the two theories d i f f e r  u n t i l ,  
fo r  example, two theorems, one from each o f  the theor ies ,  are shown to be 
inconsis tent .  Fourth ly ,  the scope o f  two theor ies  cannot e a s i l y  be compared 
unless large numbers o f  theorems are deduced. I t  would c l e a r l y  be a def ic ien  
cy o f  theoret ica l  approaches a l t e r n a t i v e  to t h a t  presented here i f  they were 
unable to demonstrate th a t  the theorems proved here followed from those 
a l te rn a t iv e s .  In the absence o f  a d i r e c t  experimental t e s t  to decide be­
tween the theor ies ,  comparison o f  theor ies  can s t i l l  be made i f  a l l  the 
consequences o f  one are included amongst the consequences o f  the other .  
Clear ly ,  i f  not r e fu te d ,  the broader theory is  to be pre fe r red .  Mere numer­
ical  comparison o f  the number o f  theorems derived from theories whose con­
sequences do not s a t i s f y  th is  dominance p r in c ip le  is d i f f i c u l t ,  however, be­
cause we need to assess the r e l a t i v e  importance o f  the theorems der ived.
As a f ina l  po in t ,  by showing t h a t  resu l ts  which prev iously  were taken only 
as em pir ica l ly  supported genera l iza t ions  can in f a c t  be derived from a 
theory, we are b e t te r  able to assess the power and economy o f  the concepts 
and assumptions used in  the theory.
In the bulk o f  th is  paper we present and prove f ive  theorems which are 
consequences o f  the l a t e s t  version o f  the status cha ra c te r is t ic s  theory.
In a l l  cases an attempt has been made to formulate these theorems in as ab­
s t r a c t  and general a form as possib le .  Special  cases and instances o f  some 
o f  the theorems t h a t  we prove have been exper imenta l ly  inves t iga ted .
However, to the best o f  our knowledge, these resu l ts  have never previously
6been shown to be der ivab le  from more general p r inc ip les  concerned with  
status organ iz ing processes as i t  occurs on the interpersonal l e v e l .
A b r i e f  comment on the graph theory approach and the rules associated  
with i t  is  appropr ia te .  As an a id  in  modell ing phenomena, the re la t ions  
between elements o f  a status s i tu a t i o n  are represented in our theory by 
l ines  in a signed,  non-d irected graph. This approach enables complex 
social  s t ructures  to be represented with ease, and a l l  proofs in  this  
paper are based on graphical representat ions o f  the social  s i tu a t io n .  The 
graph theory ru les  as such are not  pa r t  o f  the theory proper but instruct ions  
for  mapping s i tu a t io n s  f a l l i n g  w i th in  the scope o f  the assumptions. The 
proofs o f  the theorems o f  course make extensive use o f  graphs, but i t  
should be emphasized th a t  the graphs are mathematical to o ls .  The theorems 
concern status s i t u a t i o n s ,  not graphical s t ru c tu res .
One f in a l  remark before we pass to the exposit ion o f  the theory.  In 
this paper we have made no at tempt to discuss in de ta i l  evidence for  the 
th i rd  stage o f  the status c h a r a c te r is t ic s  theory,  nor have we gone into  
spec i f ic  d e t a i ls  about p o s s i b i l i t i e s  fo r  tes t in g  the theory. We bel ieve  
these matters m er i t  d e ta i le d  discussion.  We therefore  leave consideration  
o f  these issues fo r  a fu ture  report  in which they can be dea l t  with f u l l y  
and in t h e i r  own r i g h t .
§1 Outl ine o f  the Theory
A minimal exposit ion o f  the major assumptions o f  the status charac­
t e r i s t i c s  theory w i l l  be given f i r s t .  The reader  u n fam i l ia r  with the 
theory is urged to consult  Berger,  Fisek and Norman (1977 ) ,  which pro­
vides motivat ion and applicat ions fo r  the o u t l in e  provided here. Those 
already f a m i l i a r  with the- theory may-wish to s t a r t  w i i h . ^ 2 . and r e f e r ־ back-  
to the assumptions o f  §1 as necessary. Throughout the paper, the fo l low­
ing notat ional  conventions are used.
־ p, o (with or without  subscr ip ts )  r e f e r  to actors
-  C.¡ denotes the i ^  s p e c i f i c  status c h a r a c t e r is t i c ,
with C.j(+ ) ,  C.j( - )  denoting the p o s i t iv e ly  and 
negat ive ly  evaluated s ta tes  o f  t h a t  c h a ra c t e r is t i c ,  
respecti  vely
- D.j denotes the i ^  d i f fu s e  status c h a r a c t e r is t i c ,  with states  
D-j ( + ) ,  Di ( - )
-  T is the task outcome, with s ta tes  T ( + ) ,  T ( - )
-  C* is  the task instrumental c h a r a c t e r is t i c
-  S, with various superscr ip ts ,  is a task s i tu a t io n
The theory is  concerned with descr ib ing the s ta tus-organ iz ing  pro­
cess which occurs among a number o f  actors in a task -or ien ted  s i tu a t io n ,  S*. 
The pr incipal  components o f  such s i tu a t io n s  are
1) two or more actors .  These i n t e r a c t  in p a i rs ,  but any other  
actor  may serve as a r e f e r e n t  fo r  an in te ra c t in g  p a i r .
2) status c h a r a c t e r is t i c s ,  e i t h e r  s p e c i f i c  or d i f fu s e .  A 
c h a ra c t e r is t i c  is some aspect or  property  o f  an actor  
th a t  might be used to help describe him. For our pre­
sent purposes, an important fea ture  o f  cha ra c te r is t ics
is  th a t  they have two opposite ly  evaluated s ta te s .
3) a group task T ,  having two opposite ly  evaluated s ta tes .
The actors are assumed to be l ieve  tha t  there ex is ts  a 
p a r t i c u la r  c h a r a c t e r is t i c  C* t h a t  is  instrumental to 
the group task .  I f  an ac tor  possesses the p o s i t iv e ly  
evaluated s ta te  o f  C*, he expects or is expected to 
a t t a i n  the success outcome o f ־ the ־task T(+}-,  whi le  i f  ־־־ 
he possesses the negat ive ly  evaluated s ta te ,  he expects 
or is  expected to achieve the f a i l u r e  outcome o f  the 
task ,  T ( - ) .
Actors; s ta tes  o f  c h a r a c t e r is t i c s ,  goal ob jec ts ,  abs trac t  task a b i l ­
i t y ,  or s p e c i f ic  task outcomes; generalized expectat ion s ta tes ;  and task 
outcome states can appear as points or , elements'  in the non-directed  
signed graph which is used as our mathematical model o f  the status organ­
iz in g  process. Lines between points o f  the graph can represent the fo l low­
ing types o f  r e l a t i o n s .
a) Possession: This can only hold between an actor and a s ta te  o f  
a c h a r a c t e r is t i c .
b) Relevance, which is defined as: element e  ^ is re levant  to
element e .  i f  and only i f  when x possesses e . ,  then x expects
or is expected to possess e . .  This r e la t io n  can hold between
J
any two elements in the graph, except where one or both points 
represent  actors in the s i t u a t i o n ,  or the points represent  
opposite ly  evaluated states o f  the same c h a r a c t e r is t i c ,  goal-  
o b je c t ,  ac t iv a te d  or induced element,  or task.
c) Dimensionali ty ,  which e x is ts  between elements e  ^ and e j  i f  and 
only i f  e- and e^ are oppos ite ly  evaluated states o f  the same
c h a ra c t e r is t i c  and both these states are possessed by actors
in the s i tu a t io n .
In the graph, l ines  represent ing possession and relevance re la t ions  
are assigned a pos it ive  sign,  whi le  those represent ing dimensionality are 
assigned a negative sign.
The fo l lowing assumptions are rules o f  the theory are needed for  
our proofs. The numbering o f  Be'rger, Fisek and Norman1977 }־־) - is- re ta ined.  
Assumption 1 (Salience Completion Process)
1. Given ex is t in g  paths connecting an in te ra c ta n t  to outcome 
states o f  the group task ,  the elements and re la t io n s  in these 
paths become s a l i e n t  in the task s i t u a t i o n ;  and
2. Given status c h a ra c te r is t ic s  th a t  provide a basis for  d i s c r i ­
mination between in te r a c ta n ts ,  the states o f  these charac­
t e r i s t i c s  become s a l i e n t  in the task s i t u a t i o n .
Rule 1 (Diagramming the Saliency S truc ture )
1. Determine what elements are s a l i e n t  in the task s i tu a t io n  by:
a) d e f in i t io n  o f  the task group; and
b) app l ica t ion  o f  the sa l ience  completion assumption. 
Represent each by a point  in the diagram.
2. Determine the re la t ionsh ips  among the s a l i e n t  elements in the 
s i tu a t io n .  Draw in a l in e  with a pos i t iv e  sign for  every  
possession and relevance r e l a t i o n  th a t  holds between the 
elements. Draw in a l in e  with  a negative sign between two 
opposite ly  evaluated states o f  a c h a r a c t e r is t i c  i f  both 
states are possessed by actors in the s i t u a t i o n .
Assumption 2 (Burden o f  Proof Completion Process)
Given th a t  a s a l i e n t  status element,  possessed or connected to an
in te r a c ta n t ,  is  not connected to the task,  or is  connected by an ex is t ing  
path o f  length 5 or  g re a te r ,  then:
1) I f  the status element is  the s ta te  o f  a d i f fuse  status charac 
t e r i s t i c ,  the associated generalized expectat ion s ta te  w i l l  
be a c t iv a te d ,  and i t  w i l l  become re levan t  to a s im i l a r l y  eval 
uated s ta te  o f  C*.
2) I f  the status element is  the s ta te  o f  a s p e c i f ic  character ­
i s t i c ,  i t s  re levant  task outcome s ta te  w i l l  be act iva ted .
This task outcome s ta te  w i l l  become re levan t  to a s i m i l a r ly  
evaluated s ta te  o f  abs trac t  t a s k - a b i 1i t y , and the l a t t e r  w i l l  
become re levant  to a s i m i l a r l y  eva luated outcome state  o f  the 
group task.
Assumption 3 (Sequencing o f  Structure Completion)
A given s t ructure  w i l l  be developed through the sa l iency process for  
the in te ra c t in g  actors.  I f  a non interact ing  ac tor  should l a t e r  become an 
in te r a c ta n t ,  then the s t ructure  w i l l  be fu r th e r  developed, i f  necessary, 
through the operation o f  the s t ruc ture  completion process. For any actor ,  
those parts o f  his s t ructure  completed in r e l a t i o n  to  a former in te ra c ta n t  
remain whi le  the actor  is in the given s i tu a t io n  S* .
The next ru le  is important fo r  eva lua t ing  the consistency o f  a set  
o f  paths connecting an actor  to the task outcome s ta tes .
Rule 3 (Sign o f  a Path)
The sign o f  a path from an actor  to a task outcome is determined by 
the a lgebra ic  product o f  the signs o f  the l in e s  co n s t i tu t in g  the path and 
the eva lua t iona l  sign o f  the task outcome t h a t  is  the f in a l  point  o f  the 
path.
Rule 4 ( E f f e c t i v e  Paths)
The paths e f f e c t i v e  in determining expectat ions fo r  an actor  x are
11
a l l  paths l i n k i n g  the actor  to one o f  the task outcomes, w ith  the fo l low ­
ing except ions:
1. Paths o f  length greater  than s ix  are not e f f e c t i v e .
2 .  I f  a graph contains a l in e  jo in in g  two po in ts ,  ne i the r  
o f  which is  an ac to r ,  then any path conta in ing a sub­
path o f  length two or  more jo in in g  these same two points
%.
i s  not e f f e c t i v e .
3. I f  there is  a path connecting an ac tor  to a task outcome 
then any second path to the same task outcome o f  equal 
or g rea te r  length with the same sign is not e f f e c t i v e  i f  
i t  has more negative l ines  than the f i r s t  path.
Moving to the assumptions concerning the computation o f  aggregated 
expectat ions,  we f i r s t  introduce a decreasing funct ion f  from the posit ive  
integers to the open in te rv a l  (0 ,  1 ) ,  f :N ■+ (0 ,  1 ) .  f ( i , )  is  a measure of  
the "strength" o f  a path o f  length Z .  By combining assumptions 4.1 and 
4.2 o f  the o r ig in a l  theory,  we have the fo l low ing :
Assumption 4 (Formation o f  Aggregated Expectat ion States)
I f  an ac to r  x is  connected to the outcome s ta te  o f  the group task by 
sets o f  p o s i t iv e  paths and negative paths, these paths w i l l  f i r s t  be com­
bined w i th in  l i k e - s i g n  subsets to y i e l d  a p o s i t iv e -p a th  value e*  and a 
negative-paths value e~ in the fo l lowing fashion.  Given strengths  
f ( i )  , . . . , f ( n ) ,  and f ' ( i ) ,  . . . f ' ( n )  o f  paths w i th in  the posi t i  ve-  
paths subset and negative-paths subset r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  then,  
e *  1] ־ -  ( l - f ( i ) )  . . . t l - f t n ) ) ]
e1] -  ־ ־  -  ( l - f ( i ) )  . . . ( l - f ' ( n ) ) ]
The aggregated expectat ion state  is then given by
e = e+ + e" 
x x x
Assumption 5 (Basic Expectat ion Assumption)
Given th a t  p has formed aggregated expectat ion states fo r  s e l f  and 
other ,  p's power and pres t ige  pos it ion  r e l a t i v e  to 0 w i l l  be a d i r e c t  func-  
t ion o f  p's expectation advantage over 0 .
For a p p l ic a t io n ,  we requ ire  a s p e c i f ic  form o f  the function mentioned 
in Assumption 5. Such a funct ion is  provided by Assumption 5 * .  I t  should 
be stressed,  however, t h a t  the theorems o f  t h is  paper do'not depend upon ־ 
the p a r t ic u la r  function introduced in 5* .  Empirical tests  o f  the theory 
are possible through a p p l ic a t io n  o f  our l a s t  assumption which re la te s  p's 
power and prest ige pos i t ion  to his expectat ion advantage. The former is  
best indicated by the p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an a c to r 's  staying with his own choice 
when faced with disagreement from another ac to r .  This is the stay-response  
p r o b a b i l i t y ,  and we consider i t  to  be a funct ion o f  p's expectation ad-  
vantage.
Assumption 5*
The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an ac to r ,  p, staying w ith  his own choice given a 
disagreement from another ac tor  with whom he is  in te ra c t in g  is  given by 
the fol lowing funct ion:
P (s)  = m + q ( e  - e ) ,  where m and q are empirical  
p P 0
ג­
constants
One obvious question a r i s in g  from the preamble to Assumption 4 is 
whether there is  any connection between the values f ( i )  fo r  d i f f e r e n t  i .
In fac t ,  the theory introduces an important substantive assumption which 
re lates the values o f  d i f f e r e n t  f ( i ) :
Pa ra l le l  Paths Assumption ^
Given a number o f  paths o f  length £ + 1 in p a r a l l e l ,  there ex is ts  a 
posit ive  fa c to r  k such t h a t  k p a r a l l e l  paths o f  length £ + 1 have the same 
e f f e c t  as a s ingle  path o f  length £. That is  [ l - f ( £ ) ]  = [1 -  f ( £ + l ) ] ^ .
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At th is  stage o f  the theory,  we assume t h a t  k is a constant (not  
necessari ly  in te ger -v a lu ed )  fo r  a l l  £. However, none o f  the theorems 
proved here depend e s s e n t ia l l y  on th a t  assumption, and generalizat ions  
o f  the theory to a l low fo r  a va r iab le  path combination factor  k w i l l  s t i l l  
have these theorems as consequences. Before s ta t in g  the theorems two pre­
l im inary  d e f in i t io n s  are in order .  v 
A path o f  task relevance is a path l in k in g  an actor to a s ta te  o f  
the task.  Unless otherwise noted, whenever we use the term , p a th ' ,  
we mean ' e f f e c t i v e  p a th ' .
The degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between actors p and o is  measured by
the expectat ion d i f fe ren c e  between p and o;  i . e . ,  e -  e . We say p
P o
and o are status equals when e = e .
--------------- a-------- P. o
§2 Derivations from the Theory
The f i r s t  three theorems t h a t  we prove are " d i f f e r e n t ia t i o n  theorems." 
They have in common the fa c t  th a t  they are concerned with condit ions th a t  
are re la ted  to the degree o f  e q u a l i t y  and in e q u a l i ty  th a t  w i l l  obtain among 
the members o f  a task or iented  group.
As is t rue o f  a l l  our theorems, they are formulated in general and 
abstract  terms and are "co nd i t ion a l ized"  only in the sense th a t  i t  is 
assumed that  the task or iented  group is  operating under S* condit ions.
Each o f  these theorems s t ip u la te s  in an exact manner how a p a r t i c u la r  status  
condition a f fe c ts  the power and prest ige  order th a t  ex is ts  in the group. I t  
is to be noted tha t  specia l  cases or  p a r t i c u l a r  instances o f  these theorems 
have been previously  taken as e m p i r ic a l l y  supported assertions (see Berger, 
Fisek, Norman, and Ze ld i tch  (1 9 7 7 ) ,  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  page 76) .  Here we show 
that  these resul ts  are in f a c t  der ivab le  from the basic assumptions o f  the 
status ch a ra c te r is t ic s  theory.
Before turning to our theorems, some pre l im inary  comments are in 
order .  Most o f  the examples we present are expressed in terms o f  speci­
f i c  status c h a r a c t e r is t i c s .  I t  cannot be emphasized too s t rongly  th a t  
a l l  theorems o f  th is  section hold fo r  d i f fu se  as well  as s p e c i f i c  status  
c h a r a c t e r is t i c s , and f o r  s tructures contain ing both kinds. Further ,  in 
the f i r s t  three theorems, states o f  s p e c i f i c  task outcomes, generalized  
expectation s ta te s ,  or abs trac t  task a b i l i t y ,  which we r e f e r  to as 
act ivated or induced elements, can also occur as elements in the path 
l in k in g  the actors to the task .  F i n a l ly  in what fo l lows,  we define a 
discr iminat ing  status c h a r a c t e r is t i c  as a status c h a r a c t e r is t i c  both o f  
whose opposite ly  eva luated states are possessed by ( d i f f e r e n t )  actors in 
the s i tu a t io n .
In our f i r s t  theorem, we are in te re s te d  in showing tha t  decreasing 
the distance between a status c h a r a c t e r is t i c  and the task outcome increases 
the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  e f f e c t  o f  th a t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  That i s ,  the greater  
the strength o f  relevance between a d isc r im ina t ing  status c h a ra c te r is t ic  
and the task to which actors are addressed, the more powerful is the e f f e c t  
o f  tha t  c h a ra c t e r is t i c  in c rea t ing  i n e q u a l i t y  among the actors in the system.
Consider the fo l low ing  s i t u a t io n s :  (1 )  p and o are males and are 
known to possess d i f f e r e n t  states o f  mechanical a b i l i t y ,  say p has the 
high and o low s ta te  o f  the a b i l i t y ;  (2 )  p is  male and o is  female and 
in th e i r  cu l ture  males are expected to possess high and females low states  
o f  mechanical a b i l i t y .  Further ,  assume th a t  the task confronted by p and 
o in each s i tu a t io n  is  one invo lv ing  mechanical a b i l i t y .  We argue th a t  
there is smal ler distance between the d iscr im ina t ing  c h a r a c t e r is t i c  (states  
o f  mechanical a b i l i t y )  and the mechanical task in the f i r s t  s i tu a t io n  than 
between the d iscr im ina t ing  c h a r a c t e r is t i c  (s ta te s  o f  male and female) and 
the mechanical task in the second s i t u a t i o n .  In the f i r s t  case, as compared
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to the second, the d iscr im ina t ing  c h a r a c t e r is t i c  is more immediately r e l e ­
vant to the task .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  the st rength o f  relevance o f  mechanical 
a b i l i t y  to the mechanical task is  g rea te r  than th a t  o f  the sexual status  
c h a ra c te r is t ic  to the mechanical task .  Now claiming th a t  the in e q u a l i ty  
produced by a d iscr im inat ing  c h a r a c t e r is t i c  is  a d i re c t  function o f  i t s  
strength o f  re levance,  we argue t h a t  the power and prest ige d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
based on the status c h a r a c t e r is t i c  o f  mechanical a b i l i t y  w i l l  be greater  than 
th a t  based on the sexual status c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  S ta t ing  th is  relevance 
in e q u a l i ty  r e la t io n  as a general and abs trac t  theorem, we have:
THEOREM 1 (Relevance Strength and D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n )  Given a pa i r  
 ^ o f  possessed states o f  a d isc r im ina t ing  status c h a r a c t e r is t i c ,  the 
greater  the st rength o f  relevance between these states and the 
task outcomes, the greater  the degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  on that  
status c h a r a c t e r is t i c .
Proof We are concerned with the kind o f  status s i tu a t io n  described in the
following s t ructure :
p — - — C, ( + ) ---------C ( + ) ---------—  C * ( + ) ------- -------T(+)
i 0
o־_ —  C, ( - ) ---------Cn ( - )  ---------—  C*(־ ) ------ ^— T( ־ )
where we also al low the s i tu a t io n  th a t  C-| = Cn = C*. Then, as n decreases', 
the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  e f f e c t  o f  increases.
Without loss o f  g e n e ra l i ty  we may assume t h a t  p is connected by pos i t ive  
paths to T. Note also th a t  there is  a d i r e c t  connection between the short ­
ness o f  a path o f  task relevance connecting two elements and the strength  
o f  relevance between those elements. Namely, the shorter  path the greater  
the strength o f  relevance.
Now consider two s i tu a t io n s  S* and SA. Let  the number o f  status  
elements between p and T in the sho rtes t  path o f  task relevance in S* be 
n* ,  and the number in  SA be nA, with  n*  < nA.
We now have e *  = 1 1] ־ -  f ( n * + l ) ]  [1 -  f ( n * + 2 ) ]
P
e*  = -  {1 ־ [ l - f ( n * + l ) ]  [1 -  f ( n * + 2 ) ] }  
o
and hence e *  -  e *  = 2 -  2[1 -  f ( n * + l ) ]  [1 -  f ( n * + 2 ) ]
P o
S i m i l a r l y ,  eA -  eA = 2 -  2[1 ־ f ( n A+ l ) ]  [1 -  f ( nA+2) ]
P o
f  is a decreasing function of~path־~length7  and n *  ^ nA, ־ so־־־-
f ( n A+ l )  < f ( n * + l ) and f ( n A+2) < f (n * + 2 )
which gives e*  -  e *  > eA -  eA, which is the desired r e s u l t .
3 P o p o
We point  out a t  th is  stage t h a t ,  given Assumption 5 * ,  when e*  -  e *  > 
ep ־ eQ we have P * (s ) -  P * (s ) > Pp(s) -  Pq ( s )> and hence the degree o f  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in S* and SA can be compared d i r e c t l y .
Theorem two o f  our d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  theorems is  concerned with re la t in g  
the number o f  cha ra c te r is t ic s  tha t  d iscr im inate  between p and o and the 
magnitude o f  t h e i r  status in e q u a l i ty .
I f  actors possess common states o f  c h a r a c t e r is t i c s  tha t  are s a l ie n t  
and there are no d iscr im inat ing  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  then in t h e i r  s i tu a t io n  ' 
they w i l l  be status equals.  As d iscr im ina t ing  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  are i n t r o ­
duced in to  the s i t u a t i o n ,  status in e q u a l i ty  is  generated. The question 
a t  issue now is what are the propert ies o f  t h is  r e la t io n  between status  
discr im inat ion  and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  P r io r  to the in troduct ion  o f  a d is ­
cr im inat ing  c h a r a c t e r is t i c  there is no basis on which to d ist ingu ish be­
tween the actors in  the system. Consequently, the in troduct ion  o f  an 
i n i t i a l  d iscr im inat ing  c h a ra c t e r is t i c  provides the actors with a r e l a t i v e l y  
large amount o f  new status informat ion.  In t u r n ,  th is  new (and novel)  
status informat ion is the basis for  a large  increment in status d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t i o n .  Under these condit ions the in t ro d u c t io n  o f  an add it iona l
discr iminat ing  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  assuming tha t  i t  is  a l lo ca ted  consistant  
with the i n i t i a l  c h a r a c t e r is t i c ,  confirms and strengthens the i n i t i a l  
status d is t in c t io n  and therefore  increases by some amount the d i f f e r e n t i a ­
t ion  between the actors in  the system. However, the add i t iona l  status  
d is t in c t io n  is  provid ing information which in terms o f  performance expecta­
t ions is e s s e n t i a l l y  o f  the nature o f :  "more o f  the same." Consequently, 
we should expect th a t  the increase־ in ־־d i ' f f e r e n t i^ t io n ־produced by־ the“  
second c h a r a c t e r is t i c  is  less than tha t  produced by the i n i t i a l  status dis­
t in c t io n .  And in  general i t  should be the case th a t  there is  a decrease in 
incremental d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  produced with each add i t iona l  status d is t in c t io n .  
These features o f  the r e la t io n  between the number o f  d iscr im inat ing  charac­
t e r i s t i c s  and status d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  are consequences o f  our formulation  
and are embodied in the second theorem.
THEOREM 2 (Number o f  D iscr iminating C h arac te r is t ics  and D i f f e r e n t ia t io n )  
Given th a t  the actors possess states o f  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  th a t  are 
equally  r e le v a n t  to the task outcome and are c o n s is ten t ly  al located^  
the grea te r  the number o f  d iscr im inat ing  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  the greater  
the degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  As the number o f  d iscr im ina t ing  charac­
t e r i s t i c s  increases ,  there is a decrease in  the incremental d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t i o n  in adding c h a r a c t e r is t i c s .
Proof
We are consider ing here s i tu a t ions  o f  the fo l low ing  form:
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Once again ,  p is  the ac tor  connected by pos i t ive  paths to T. Let  
S* be a s i tu a t io n  in which p and o possess n*  opposite ly  evaluated states  
o f  c h a r a c t e r is t i c s ,  each o f  which is  l inked via m other  elements to T. 
S im i la r ly  f o r  s i tu a t io n  SA, where n*  > nA.
Then e *  = 1 -  [ l ־ f (m + 2 ) ]n*  [1 - f (n !+3 ) ]n*
e £ - -  -  ■il—p —f(m + 2 ) ]n*  [1 - f ( m + 3 ) ] n*}
so e*  ־ e *  = 2 -  2 { [ l - f ( m + 2 ) ]  [1- f ( m + 3 ) ] } n*
P o
S im i la r ly  fo r  eA -  e^. From 0 < 1 - f (J t )  < 1 ,  i t  fol lows t h a t  n*  > nA
implies e*  -  e *  > eA -  eA. 
r p o p o
We now have to show t h a t  fo r  a f ixed  degree o f  re levance,  the addit ion o f  
each fu r the r  c h a r a c t e r is t i c  has a decreasing incremental e f f e c t .  Let the 
increase in degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in going from n d iscr im ina t ing  char­
a c te r is t ic s  to n+1 d iscr im inat ing  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  be ( e - e  ) , ־ (e -e ) .P o n+1 p o n
S im i la r ly  in going from n+1 c h a ra c te r is t ics  to n+2 c h a r a c t e r is t i c s .  Lett ing  
[1 -  f (m+2)] [1 -  f (m+3)]  = x,  we have
[ ( e - e  ) , -  ( e - e  ) ]  -  [ ( e - e  ) , ׳> -  ( e - e  n ) h+■!] = 2xn+  ^ -  4xn+  ^ + 2x°P o n+1 p o n p o n+2 p o n + i J
= 2xn ( x - 1 ) 2
n ^
Since x > 0 we immediately have t h a t  2x ( x - 1 )  > 0 and hence
[(v V ״ i ־ ,v 6»13״ * [(ep־eo> ־ 2+״  which is the desired
re s u l t .
Our t h i r d  theorem, the " incons is tency -equa l i ty"  r e s u l t  is possibly the 
most basic o f  our d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  theorems. This theorem argues th a t  there
is a fundamental r e la t io n  between the degree o f  status inconsistency and
t
the degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the claim is  made th a t  given 
a set o f  d iscr im ina t ing  status c h a ra c te r is t ic s  possessed by actors in the 
group, increasing the degree o f  inconsistency o f  these c h a ra c te r is t ic s  w i l l
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decrease t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  e f f e c t .  A l t e r n a t iv e ly ,  increasing the i n ­
consistency o f  these s ta tus  ch a ra c te r is t ics  w i l l  increase the degree o f  
actor  eq u a l i ty  in the system. Assume for  example, that  p and o are d is ­
criminated on sex (one is  male and the other  female) and occupational  
class (one is a s e m i -s k i l l e d  worker and the other professional)  and that  
t ra d i t io n a l  eva luations and expectations obtain for  these status d i s t in c ­
t ions.  In th is  case, i f  the male is the sem i-sk i l led  worker and the female 
is the pro fess iona l ,  th is  incons is tent  status conf igurat ion w i l l  generate 
the leas t  amount o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  from th is  set  o f  two discr iminat ing  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  On the other hand, i f  the male is also the professional  
and the female is  the s e m i -s k i l l e d  worker, th is  consistent status pat tern  
w i l l  give r ise  to the g rea tes t  degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  to be expected from 
th is  set o f  status c h a r a c t e r is t i c s .  S im i la r l y ,  assume that  p and o are 
discriminated on sex and a performance a b i l i t y  tha t  is  a sp e c i f ic  status  
c h a ra c t e r is t i c .  These status elements w i l l  produce the l e a s t  amount o f  
actor in e q u a l i ty  when the male is  believed to have the low s ta te  o f  the per­
formance a b i l i t y  and the female is believed to have the high s ta t e ,  which 
is the status incons is ten t  s i t u a t i o n .
Formulating th is  incons is tency -equa l i ty  re la t io n  for the general case 
and in the form o f  an abs trac t  theorem, we have:
THEOREM 3 (Status Inconsistency and Equal i ty )  Given a f ixed number 
o f  possessed s ta tes  o f  d iscr iminat ing  status character is t ics  that  
are equally  r e le v a n t  to the task outcome, the greater the degree o f  
inconsistency o f  these status c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  the less the degree 
o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
Proof By the hypothesis o f  the theorem, o w i l l  possess as many negative
paths o f  length Si connecting him to the task outcome as p possesses pos it ive
paths. Again we l e t  p be the actor  with the greater  number o f  pos i t ive  paths
in both s i tu a t io n s .  We consider going from s i tu a t io n  S* to s i tu a t io n  SA,
where SA has a greater  degree o f  inconsistency than S* .  Let the degree o f
n* < n£. Suppose not ,  i . e .  n*  n^. Then, from n f  + n*  = n^ + n£
we have n^ -  n^ £  0. Using n *  -  n*  > n^ -  n£, we have n£ ־ n£ < n * ' -  n^
and hence n |  -  n£ < 0 ,  which is  impossible .  Hence from n* < n^, n* -  n* >
n^ -  n£, and 0 < [ l - f ( ¿ ) ]  [ l - f ( £ + l ) ]  < 1 together with equations (2 )  and ( 3 ) ,  
we have ־
e *  -  e *  > e^ -  e^ . 
p o p o
which is  the desired r e s u l t .
Our next two theorems are "equivalency theorems." They are concerned 
with demonstrating t h a t  fundamental ly  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  information s t ruc ­
tures are in f a c t  c lo s e ly  r e la te d  to  each o th e r ,  and under cer ta in  con­
d i t ions can be s u b s t i tu te d  f o r  each o ther  without  b a s ic a l ly  changing the 
power and p res t ige  r e l a t i o n s  among the actors in the system.
Within the present  formula t ion o f  the status c h a ra c te r is t ics  theory,  
there are a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  s tructures through which actors  
may be connected to the s ta tes  o f  the instrumental task c h a r a c t e r is t i c s , • C*. 
We shall  be concerned w ith  examining three such st ructures which we designate  
respect ive ly  as assi gnment, re le v a n c e , and associational  s t ruc tu res .  In 
theorem four we concern ourselves with the r e la t io n  between assignment and 
relevance s t r u c t u r e s ,  and in theorem f iv e  the r e la t io n  between relevance and 
associat ional s t r u c t u r e s .  I t  is to be noted th a t  these three s tructures  
c e r ta in ly  do not exhaust the ways by which p and o can be connected to the 
states o f  the task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  in status s i tu a t io n s ,  but they do repre­
sent some o f  the most basic and f re q u en t ly  encountered s i tu a t io n s .
How may actors be connected to states o f  the instrumental character ­
i s t i c ?  F i r s t ,  the actors may a c t u a l l y  possess states o f  the instrumental  
task c h a r a c t e r is t i c .  In such a s i t u a t i o n  we say tha t  the states o f  the
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status inconsistency be given by
where n•¡^  is  the number o f  p o s i t iv e  paths o f  length £ connecting p to the 
task outcome, and n2 is  the number o f  negative paths o f  length £ connecting 
p to the task outcome7־ We-have-that n^- is  the number, o f -n egat ive  paths״ . 
connecting o to the task outcome and is the number o f  p os i t iv e  paths.
As SA has a g re a te r  degree o f  inconsistency than S* ,  we have
" i -
I2
1 < | ״ i  ־ n 2
־־i ♦ ״ s
n *  + n*
which by the hypothesis o f  the theorem y ie lds
nf  - nA < n *  - n*1 2 1 2
Using the assumption t h a t  n* > n* and n^ > nA we may drop the modulus 
signs to get nA -  nA < n*  -  n* .  (1)
By Assumption 4 ,  the aggregated expectat ion fo r  p in S* is  given by
*  *  *  *  
e *  = {1 1 ]  ־- f U ) ] 1״  C l - f ( £ + l ) ] n i } ־ { l - [ l - f ( £ ) ] n2 [ l - f ( £ + l ) ] n2 
= ( [ i - f ( i ) ]  [ i - f U + i ) ] ) n2 -  ( O m ) ]  [ i - f ( £ + i ) ] ) " i  
e *  = {1 -  [ l - f (  £) ]"2  [ 1 - f f r + 1 ) ] " * }  -  {1 -  [ l - f ( £ ) ] n*  [ 1 - f U + l ) ] " 1} 
= ( t l - f f c ) ]  [ l ־ f ( i - + l ) ] ) nl  -  ( [ l - f ( * ) ]  [ l - f ( * + l ) ] ) n2 
Hence e* ־ e *  = 2( [1 - f (n  ) ]  [ l - f (  £+1 ) ] ) " 2  { l - ( [ l - f ( £ ) ]  [ l - f (  £+1 ) ] ) " * 2)  {2" ־) 
S im i la r ly  eA -  e£ = 2( [ l - f (  £)] [ l - f (  £+1 ) ] ) n^ { l - (  [ l - f (  £ ) ] [ l - f (  £+1 ) ] ) " £  2־ ״  } 
We argue as fo l lo w s .  From (1 )  we have n^ -  n^ > nA -  n^. We need to show
task c h a ra c te r is t ic  have been assigned to p and o, and p and o have d i rec t  
informat ion about t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to succeed a t  the task. Assume for  example, 
t h a t  p and o know th a t  p possesses the high and o the low o f  s tate  C*.
In th is  s i tu a t io n  the information s t ruc tu re  is such tha t  p and o be!ieve  
tha t  p is  competent and o is  incompetent with respect to the a b i l i t y  re­
quired fo r  t h e i r  task.  In an assignment structure  the information about 
task a b i l i t i e s  is  n o n - in fe re n t ia l  and immediate: p has the a b i l i t y ,  or does 
not have the a b i l i t y .
There is  a second basic way actors may be connected to the instrumental  
task c h a r a c t e r is t i c .  P and o may be l ink ed  to the states o f  C* via a 
number o f  other  status c h a r a c t e r is t i c s ,  e i t h e r  sp e c i f ic  or d i f fu s e .  That 
i s ,  p and o may possess states o f  these c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  which, in turn,  
are d i r e c t l y  re levant  to the states o f  C*. In such a s i tu a t io n  we say tha t  
there is a relevance structure  connecting p and o to the states o f  the task 
c h a r a c t e r is t i c .  In  th is  case p and o have in d i r e c t  information about t h e i r  
r e l a t i v e  a b i l i t i e s  to succeed a t  the task .  Assume for  example, that  p 
possesses C-j ( + ) and o possesses ( - )  and th a t  the states o f  are r e l e ­
vant in a consis tent  manner with the states o f  the task a b i l i t y .  In th is  
s i tu a t io n  the information s t ruc ture  is  such tha t  p and o expect that  p w i l l  
be competent and tha t  o w i l l  be incompetent with respect to the task a b i l i t y .  
In a relevance s t ructure  the informat ion about task a b i l i t y  is  non-immediate 
and i n f e r e n t i a l .  I t  is  informat ion about an t ic ipa t ions  and expectancies: p 
expects tha t  he has the a b i l i t y  or  he expects that  he does not have the 
a b i l i t y  to succeed a t  the task.
From an informational  s tandpoin t ,  an assignment structure  is a s tructure  
b e l ie fs  about task capacit ies  t h a t  the actors hold, while a relevance 
structure  is a s t ructure  o f  expectancies tha t  the actors hold about t h e i r  
task a b i l i t i e s .  We now argue tha t  there ex is ts  a •crucial  re la t io n  between
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these types o f  s t ruc tures :  tha t  fo r  ce r ta in  basic  types o f  assignment s t ruc­
tures there  e x i s t  corresponding basic types o f  relevance structures that  
are beh av io ra l ly  equ iva len t .  That i s ,  i f  p and o are status unequals in 
the given assignment s t ru c tu re ,  t h e i r  status in e q u a l i ty  w i l l  be a t  leas t  as 
great in  the relevance s tructure  and i f  they are status equals in the 
assignment s t ru c tu re ,  t h e i r  status e q u a l i t y  w i l l  be maintained in the 
corresponding relevance s t ru c tu re .  Put another way, the claim is tha t  for  
given basic structures o f  task b e l ie fs  t h a t  p and o may hold, i t  is possible 
to specify  and construct structures o f  task expectancies th a t  are behavior­
a l l y  e qu iva len t .
Socio logists  have long held th a t  s t ruc tures  o f  expectancies are 
re la ted  to structures o f  b e l i e f s .  For example, in an e a r l i e r  formulation  
o f  the status cha ra c te r is t ic s  theory,  Berger,  Cohen, and Zeldi tch assumed 
tha t  under spe c i f ied  condit ions,  s tructures o f  task expectancies are t rans­
formed in to  structures o f  task b e l ie fs  (see Berger,  Cohen, and Zelditch  
(1972) ,  in p a r t i c u la r ,  page 246, assumptions two and th r e e ) .  Our object  
now is to der ive from the more basic p r in c ip le s  in th is  formulation a 
fundamental r e la t io n  between these types o f  s t r u c tu re s .  To do this we must 
f i r s t  introduce some technical concepts which w i l l  become part  o f  our 
"relevance-assi gnment" theorem.
D e f in i t io n  1 A basic assignment s t ructure  is a s t ructure  in which the 
only relevance bonds are those between the s ta tes  o f  C*, the instrumental  
c h a r a c t e r is t i c ,  and the respect ive outcome sta tes  o f  T,  the task.  Further,  
there are no re fe ren t  actors in the s t r u c t u r e ,  and the actors each possess 
a s tate  o f  C*.
D e f in i t io n  2 A basic relevance s t ruc ture  is a s t ructure  in which the 
fo l lowing condit ions are s a t i s f i e d :
1. there are no re fe re n t  actors;
2.  there is  exac t ly  one relevance bond between a possessed 
admissible element and a s ta te  o f  the instrumental  
c h a r a c t e r is t i c  C*.
An example o f  a basic relevance structure  is given on p. 25. We use the
terminology , basic '  here j u s t  because relevance structures with shortest
paths o f  length three are the simplest  cases where e x p l i c i t  expectancies
occur in the path o f  task re levance.  In f a c t ,  these basic relevance
structures cover a large  proportion of  the s o c ia l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  s i tuat ions
where power and prest ige orders are established so le ly  on the basis o f
e x p l i c i t  task expectancies.
The question now i s :  given a basic s t ructure  o f  task b e l ie fs  (an
assignment s t r u c tu r e )  can we s t ip u la te  and construct a corresponding
structure  o f  task expectancies (a relevance s t ruc tu re )  that  is  behaviora l ly
equivalent? Theorem four states th a t  th is  is  indeed the case.
THEOREM 4 (Relevance and Assignment) Given a basic assignment 
s t r u c tu r e ,  there is  a basic relevance structure  in which the 
degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between the actors is a t  l e a s t  as great ’ 
as i t  was in the assignment s t ru c tu re .  And in p a r t i c u l a r ,  i f  the 
actors a re -s ta tus  equals in the assignment s t ru c tu re ,  there is a 
relevance s t ruc tu re  in which t h e i r  status eq u a l i ty  is  maintained.
Proof There are only three possible basic assignment s t ruc tu res ,  and for  
each we can construct  the appropr iate  relevance s t ruc tu re .
•........... + .  + . . .
Casé 1 p — ....■ ־־■־ •'C* (+)    1־(,+)
o _ _ _ _ _ _  c * ( - )  ■ T ( - )
+ +
There i s o n e  po s i t iv e  path o f  length two, and one pos i t ive  path o f  length - 
three connecting p with the task outcome, o has s im i la r  negative paths.
Consider the fo l lo w in g  basic relevance s t ructure :
Here 1־k1־ is the sm al les t  in te ger  which is g rea te r  than or equal to k,  the 
path combination constant .  For example, i f  k = 2 . 5 ,  r k1 = 3.  I f  k = 4 ,  
r k"1 = 4.  We now have rk"1 paths o f  length th ree ,  and r kn paths o f  length  
four l in k in g  p to the task outcome. A l l  o f  these paths are p o s i t iv e .  By 
the p a r a l l e l  paths assumption which we discussed in §1 k paths o f  length 
£ running in p a r a l l e l  are equ iva lent  to one path of  length £ -1 .  Then we 
have
[ 1 - f ( 2 ) ]  = [ l - f ( 3 ) ] k 
and [ l - f ( 3 ) ]  = [ l = f ( 4 ) ] k
Hence, as ,־k 1 _> k,  we have [ l - f ( 3 ) ] rk <_ [ l ־ f ( 3 ) ] k = [ l - f ( 2 ) ]  
and [ l - f ( 4 ) ] rk '' < [ l - f ( 4 ) ] k = [ l - f ( 3 ) ]
Using Assumption 4 concerning the aggregated_expectation s ta te  fo r  paths 
o f  l i k e  s igns ,  we obtain
e t R] = ! - { [ l - f ( 3 ) ] rkl [ l - f ( 4 ) ] rk"}
P
! 1  ־ { [ l ־ f ( 3 ) ] k [ l - f ( 4 ) ] k} = 1 -  i [ l - f ( 2 ) ]  [ l - f ( 3 ) ] J
-
P
(The superscr ip t  [R]  in d ic a tes  q u a n t i t i e s  connected with the relevance 
structure;-  [ A ] - i n d i c a t e s  those connected with  the assignment s t ru c tu re )  
S im i la r ly ,  by symmetry
e [R]  < e [A] 
o — o
Hence e ^  -  e ^  > e ^  -  e
p o p o
The proof assumes t h a t  k,  the path combination fa c to r ,  is constant.  In f a c t ,  
the theorem holds even when k is a funct ion o f  a path length i as long as 
k ( i )  1.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  i f  k ( i )  decreases w i th  i ,  then taking r k~' = r ( 3 ) n 
in the proof w i l l  give the r e s u l t .
Case 2
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In this case, p and o are u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,  since they both have one p o s i t iv e  
path connecting them to the outcome.
The fo l low ing  re levance s t r u c tu r e  w i l l  c l e a r l y  r e s u l t  in the same 
u n d i f fe re n t ia te d  behavior :
C * ( + )  ----------------T(+)p -------- --— c 1 (+ )
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Case 3
This is d e a l t  w ith  in a s i m i l a r  way to case 2.
Our f i f t h  theorem is  concerned with the r e la t io n  between relevance 
structures and associa t iona l  s t r u c tu r e s .  We have already observed th a t  
there are a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  s tructures  by which actors may be connected 
to the task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  C*: in an assignment structure  the actors each 
possess a s ta te  o f  the task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  w h i le  in a relevance s t ru c tu re ,  
they possess states o f  o th e r  c h a ra c t e r is t i c s  th a t  are,  in turn,  re levant  to 
the states o f  the task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  We now consider a t h i r d  basic way 
in which actors in a status s i t u a t i o n  may be connected to the states o f  
C*. The actors may be l ink ed  to the states o f  the task c h a ra c te r is t ic  
through r e f e r e n t  ac to rs .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  there may e x is t  in the s i tu a t io n  
re fe ren t  actors who possess the s ta tes  o f  a status c h a ra c te r is t ic  tha t  is 
possessed by p and o and who also possess the states o f  the task character ­
i s t i c .  In th is  s i t u a t i o n ,  the c h a r a c t e r is t i c s  the actor possess and the 
task c h a r a c t e r is t i c  are associ ated with each other by v i r tu e  o f  the fa c t  
tha t  states o f  these c h a r a c t e r is t i c s  happen to be j o i n t l y  possessed by 
re ferent  actors in the s i t u a t i o n .
Assume, fo r  example t h a t  p is  a male,  D (+ ) ,  and th a t  o is a female,  
D ( - ) ,  and there e x i s t  two r e fe re n ts  in the s i t u a t i o n :  0^  a male known to 
possess the low s ta te  o f  the task a b i l i t y ,  C * ( - ) ,  and 0^ a female known to 
possess the high s ta te  o f  the task a b i l i t y ,  C * ( + ) .  In th is  s i tu a t io n  p and 
o know t h a t  o ther  actors who are l i k e  them, in that  they are male or female,  
also are task incompetent o r  task competent.  The information tha t  p and o
have r e la t in g  them to the task a b i l i t y  is  information about how, as a matter  
o f  contingent f a c t  in t h e i r  re levant  social  world,  being a male or female 
is associated with  d i f f e r e n t  lev e ls  o f  task a b i l i t y .  What p knows about 
the r e la t io n  between sexual status and task a b i l i t y  i s :  there is someone 
who,l ike  me,is a male and he is  incompetent and there is someone who, l i k e  
my partner,  is female and she is  competent a t  the task .  Thus, in  th is  
s i tu a t io n ־,־ p and o 's  s t ruc tu re  provides informat ion on־which~status—elements ■ 
are j o i n t l y  possessed by ac to rs ,  and how status elements as a matter o f  
social  f a c t  happen to be associated with each o ther .
We have th a t  a relevance s t ructure  is  a s tructure  o f  expectancies that  
the actors hold about task a b i l i t i e s ,  while  an associational  s tructure  is 
a structure  o f  actual s ta tu s - ta s k  a b i l i t y  associations tha t  the actors know 
e x is t  in t h e i r  immediate social  world.  We now argue tha t  these two types 
o f  structures can also be shown to be b eh av io ra l ly  re la ted  to each other:  
that  for  ce r ta in  types o f  relevance s tructures  there are associational  
structures th a t  are beh av io ra l ly  eq u iva len t .  Again behavioral equivalence 
is to be understood to mean: i f  p and o are status unequals in the given 
relevance s t ruc tu re  t h e i r  status in e q u a l i t y  w i l l  be a t  l e a s t  as great in 
the associational  s t r u c tu r e ,  and i f  they are status equals in the relevance 
structure t h e i r  e q u a l i t y  is maintained in the corresponding associational  
s t r u c tu r e .
Again i t  is  correc t  to note th a t  soc io log is ts  have previously  argued,
( in one form or  another) t h a t  s tructures  o f  actual associations between 
p a r t ic u la r  status elements are often re la te d  to and give r is e  to structures  
o f  expectancies invo lv ing  these elements. For an example o f  one such argu­
ment as i t  applies to status c h a r a c te r is t ic s  and rewards, see Berger, e t  a l ,  
(1972).  In the present  context  our ob jec t ive  again is to derive a re la t io n  . 
between s t r u c tu re s ,  in th is  case, between basic relevance and associational
s t r u c t u r e s .
Before s t a t in g  and proving our "associa t ion-re levance"  theorem, some 
f u r th e r  p r e l im in a r ie s  are in order.
D e f in i t io n  3 A basic associational  s t ruc tu re  is  a structure  in which there  
is  a t  l e a s t  one re fe r e n t  ac to r ,  the only relevance bonds are between states  
o f  C* and T, and there are no s ta tes  o f  a c t iva ted  or induced elements in 
the s t ru c tu re .
One way o f  obta in ing basic assoc ia t iona l  s t ru c tu res ,  which is  em­
ployed ex te n s iv e ly  in the proof o f  Theorem 5 ,  is  to replace a l l  relevance 
bonds between states o f  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  by pairs  o f  possession bonds l in k in g  
r e f e r e n t  actors to those s ta te s .  Let us ca l l  any any associational  s t ruc ­
ture  gained from a relevance s t ruc tu re  by such a method a derived associational  
s t ru c tu re .  A simple example o f  such a derived s tructure  is th is :
o
T ( + )
T ( ־ )
Déf in i  t i  on : A s t ruc tu re  is symmetri c i f  e x a c t ly  the same paths connect p 
and o to the same task outcome s ta tes  o r ;  i f  fo r  every path connecting p to 
a task outcome s t a t e ,  there is a path connecting o to the opposite ly  e v a l ­
uated task outcome s ta te  which is id e n t ic a l  to p's path except th a t  each 
s ta te  o f  an element in p's path is  replaced by the opposite ly  evaluated  
s ta te  o f  the element in o's path.
Défi ni t ion : A s t ruc tu re  is consi s ten t   ^ i f  i t  is t rue for every ac tor  th a t
each o f  h is  e f f e c t i v e  paths to a task outcome sta te  has the same sign.
We r e s t r i c t  the statement o f  Theorem 5 to cons is ten t ,  symmetric struc 
tu res .  An example o f  the type o f  s t ructure  to  which th is  theorem is appli  
cable was given on page 25 . Although we b e l ieve  the theorem also holds
T *-־ : I
under other  condit ions i t  has s t i l l  to be shown fo r  the f u l l y  general 
case.
THEOREM 5 (Associa tion and R’elevance) Given a con s is ten t ,  symmetric 
basic re levance s t r u c t u r e ,  there is an associa t iona l  s t ruc tu re  in 
which the degree o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between p and o is  a t  l e a s t  as 
great  as i t  was in  the relevance s t r u c tu r e .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  i f  the 
actors are status equals in the relevance s t ruc tu re  there is  an 
assoc ia t iona l  s t ru c tu re  in which t h e i r  status e q u a l i t y  is  maintained.
Proof Because th is  is  an existence proof ,  a l l  we have to do is  to f ind  
some assoc ia t iona l  s t ru c tu re  which s a t i s f i e s  the theorem. The construc­
t ion  technique used here has the advantage t h a t  i t  can be extended to more 
complex s i t u a t i o n s  than basic relevance s t ru c tu re s .  Thus, although i t  
may not give the "minimal" derived associat ional  s t ructure  in cer ta in  
cases, i t s  g e n e r a l i t y  j u s t i f i e s  i t s  use here.
All  paths in  the type o f  basic relevance s t ruc tu re  considered here,  
are o f  length  three or four .  Let the number o f  paths o f  length l  con­
necting p to the task outcome be denoted by n^. By the symmetry o f  the 
s i t u a t i o n ,  the number o f  paths o f  length JL connecting o to T w i l l  also 
be n^. The a c t o r  p is  taken as having the expectat ion advantage. Hence 
a l l  paths connect ing p to T are p o s i t i v e ,  and a l l  paths connecting o to 
T are neg a t ive .  From the d e f i n i t io n  o f  a basic relevance s t r u c tu r e ,  there 
are n^ paths o f  the form
p — ± _  c i (+ )  — I —  C * ( + )  ' 1־( + )
connecting p and T. Replace each relevance bond between C^(+) and C*( + )
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+ A n4 \  r e f e r e n t  actors .
V n3 y
Each o f  these actors possesses both C^(+) and C * (+ ) .  (Here ,"x"1 is  again 
the smal lest  in te g e r  greater  than or equal to x ,  and, in the s i tu a t io n  
considered, n^ = n ^ . )  There w i l l  now be a t  l e a s t  kn^ + n^ pos it ive  paths 
o f  length four connecting p and T. By the p a r a l l e l  paths assumption, these 
have the same e f f e c t  as n^ paths o f  length three and n^ paths o f  length 
four,  p's aggregated expectation in the p a r t i a l l y  completed associational  
structure  is  a l ready  a t  l e a s t  as great  as i t  was in the relevance s t ructure .  
Further ,  i t  is  c le a r  t h a t  the resu l t in g  s t ru c tu re  is  s t i l l  consis tent.  Thus 
extra paths induced by new dimensional ity  bonds being formed, or previous 
paths fo r  p being lengthened by a l te ra t io n s  in  o's path to T,  cannot de­
crease p's exp ec ta t ion .  Thus for  p, ej-^ss-J _> ep ^  » where [Ass] refers  
to the associa t iona l  s t ru c tu re .  An exact ly  s i m i l a r  construction is used for  
paths between o and T. Here the expectat ion o f  o is made a t  l e a s t  as nega­
t iv e  by the add i t ion  o f  extra  paths. Thus
e [Ass] < [R] 
o — o
We thus have
e [Ass] _ e [Ass] > e [R ] _ , which is the desired
p o ־־ p o
r e s u l t .  For the special  case where p, o are status equals in the relevance 
s t ruc tu re ,  i t  is  s u f f i c i e n t  to replace each relevance bond between states  
o f  and C* by a s ingle  re fe re n t  actor  who possess the s ta tes  o f  C and C* 
which were prev ious ly  r e le v a n t .  Then p, o are c l e a r l y  s t i l l  status equals.  
This completes the proof .
Conclusion
Our task in  th is  paper has been to present and prove f iv e  theorems that  
can be derived from the l a t e s t  version o f  the status ch a ra c te r is t ic s  theory.  
These theorems are o f  two types: the f i r s t  th r e e ,  our d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
theorems, are concerned with describing the way status c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  
the re la t io n s  between status c h a r a c t e r is t i c s , and the r e la t io n  between 
status c h a ra c te r is t ic s  and the task," a f f e c t  the- degree u f  e q u a l i t y  and-׳i n —  
equa l i ty  t h a t  obtain among the members o f  a task group. The l a s t  two, our 
equivalency theorems, are concerned with describ ing s p e c i f i c  interpersonal  
structures and the re la t ions  o f  these s tructures  to each o the r .  In a l l  
cases, our theorems have been formulated in h igh ly  general and abstract  terms.
Our primary motivation in  formulating and proving these theorems is 
to f a c i l i t a t e  the task o f  t e s t in g ,  e la b o ra t in g ,  and r e f in in g  the general 
theoret ica l  ideas th a t  are concerned with the operation o f  status organizing  
processes and from which these theorems are der ived .  This is in accord with 
our methodological posit ion th a t  theorem proving can play a major role in 
the development o f  theories and th eo re t ic a l  research programs.
Aside from t h e i r  role in th e o ry -b u i ld in g ,  i t  is important to note tha t  
these theorems are o f  considerable substant ive i n t e r e s t  in t h e i r  own r ig h t .
In part  th is  stems from the fa c t  th a t  some o f  these theorems have f a i r l y  
obvious engineer ing im p l ic a t io n s . Theorem th ree ,  for  example, is the basis 
for  most o f  the highly e f fe c t i v e  "expectation t r a in in g "  procedures that  
have been developed to "overcome" the operation o f  status ch a ra c te r is t ics  
such as race and sex in b i ra c ia l  and mixed sex groups. In most o f  these 
in te rven t ion  s i t u a t i o n s ,  s p e c i f ic  status informat ion t h a t  is inconsistent
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with the race and sex assignments is introduced to modify the e f fe c t  o f  the 
diffuse status c h a ra c t e r is t i c  (see fo r  example, Cohen and Roper (1972);
Pugh and Wahrman (1978);  and Webster and D r is k e l l  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ) .  While Theorems
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four and f iv e  have not up to now been involved in  in te rvent ion  research, i t  
is c lear  th a t  they have engineering p o t e n t i a l i t i e s .  Theorem four ,  fo r  
example, provides us w ith  information on how to produce structures o f  task 
bel ie fs  among actors by manipulating st ructures o f  expectancies th a t  are 
behaviora lly  e q u iv a le n t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  Theorem f iv e  t e l l s  us how to produca 
structures o f  expectancies among actors by crea t ing  structures o f  s ta tu s -  
task associations t h a t  are beh av io ra l ly  equ iva len t .  I t  is possible tha t  
these s t ructure  theorems may provide us with as powerful engineering p r in ­
ciples as the incon s is te n c y -e q u a l i ty  p r inc ip les  th a t  we have used up to now. 
Further,  our work shows t h a t  these are a l l  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  derived p r in c ip le s .
One f in a l  observat ion about the log ica l  nature o f  our theorems. A 
standard conception o f  soc io log ica l  theorems is th a t  they assert  a func­
t ional connection between var iab les  - -  th a t  a change in one quan t i ty  is  
associated with a p a r t i c u l a r  type o f  change in a second. Our d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
theorems, in f a c t ,  are o f  th is  form. There i s ,  however, another important  
type o f  claim t h a t  a theory can make, and th a t  is  an existence cla im.  Our 
equivalency theorems are o f  th is  form. More p re c is e ly ,  these theorems have%
the form o f  a mixed quanti f i c a t io n a l  assertion where an ( i m p l i c i t )  universal  
generalizat ion contains an exi s ten t i  al l y  q u a n t i f ied  formula. When dealing  
with interpersonal  s t ruc tures  i t  is important th a t  a theory concerned with 
such structures be able to make claims concerning the types o f  s t ructure  to 
which i t  is committed, and the re la t io n s  between these s t ru c tu res .  The fact  
that  th is  can be done, as demonstrated in th is  paper,  is c e r t a in ly  o f  spec i f ic  
signi f icance to the status cha ra c te r is t ic s  theory.  Moreover, in a f i e l d  such 
as ours, where there  is much concern with t h e o r e t i c a l l y  accounting for  the 
existence o f  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  social  structures and the re la t io n s  between 
these s t r u c tu re s ,  the very fa c t  o f  our results  is also o f  general s ign i f icance .
NOTES
The l i t e r a t u r e  on formal theor ies  is  too large to mention more than a 
couple o f  sources. A good appraisal o f  the ro le  played by axiomatic
theories in  model bu i ld ing  and eva luat ion  in sociology together with
/
a comparison o f  i t s  use in physics is given in  Land (1971 ) .  See also  
Bailey (1970 ) ,  e s p e c ia l ly  his discussion o f  the views o f  Costner and 
Leik.
For a d e ta i le d  h is t o r ic a l  overview o f  the development o f  th is  t r a ­
d i t iona l  view, together  with  a discussion o f  i t s  d e f ic ie n c ie s ,  see 
Suppe (1977) .  We put no special  emphasis on the p a r t i c u la r  view o f  
theories we have adopted; any adequate method o f  axiomatiz ing a theory  
can be subst i tu ted  f o r  the view we adopt.  The important focus is on 
the exp l ic i tness  o f  the assumptions used in  a theory, and the drawing 
out o f  theorems from those assumptions. Even discursive accounts o f  
s c i e n t i f i c  theo r ies ,  such as Kuhn's,  can be made more i n t e l l i g i b l e  by 
in s is t in g  tha t  the theories be axiomat ized.  The degree o f  fo rm a l iza ­
t ion used in the axioms i s ,  to a cer ta in  ex ten t ,  a h e u r i s t ic  matter .  
The theory presented here can be f u l l y  formalized (and has been by one 
o f  the authors ) ,  using a s e t - t h e o r e t i c  approach to ax iom at iza t ion .
For the present purposes however, such completely symbolic approaches 
add nothing to the format adopted here. Indeed, such an approach 
would merely obscure important conceptual content.
The l in e a r  form o f  th is  p r o b a b i l i t y  funct ion would lead ,  i f  m and q 
were un re s t r ic te d ,  to negative values o f  P. In f a c t ,  the minimum 
value fo r  (ep -  eQ) is  - 2 .  Fur ther ,  from Chapter 5 o f  Berger,  Fisek
and Norman (1977 ) ,  empirical  invest iga t ions  give m > 0 .5  and q < 0 .2 .  
Hence, in p rac t ice  P is  always p o s i t iv e .
For those f a m i l i a r  w ith  the theory as presented in Berger,  Fisek and 
Norman (1977 ) ,  we po in t  out th a t  the Para l le l  Paths Assumption is not  
a new assumption o f  the theory.  We display i t  as a separate assumption 
here simply because o f  the central  ro le  i t  plays in the proofs o f  
Theorems 4 and 5.
Thus, fo l lowing our d e f i n i t io n  o f  degree o f  status inconsistency on 
p 20 we have t h a t  a s t ructure  is  consistent when the degree o f  status  
inconsistency is zero for  every actor .
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